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Abstract
We present cyber-security problems of high impor-
tance. We show that in order to solve these cyber-
security problems, one must cope with certain machine
learning challenges. We provide novel data sets repre-
senting the problems in order to enable the academic
community to investigate the problems and suggest
methods to cope with the challenges. We also present
a method to generate labels via pivoting, providing a
solution to common problems of lack of labels in cyber-
security.
Introduction
Cyber-security is an important area in which ma-
chine learning is becoming increasingly significant.
Many machine learning algorithms such as convolu-
tional neural networks (David and Netanyahu 2015),
LSTM (Woodbridge et al. 2016) and others
(Khorshidpour, Hashemi, and Hamzeh 2017;
McLaughlin et al. 2017; Hu and Tan 2017a;
Villegas 2017; Patri, Wojnowicz, and Wolff 2017)
were applied to cyber-security problems. It is impor-
tant to note that machine learning in cyber-security
is far more than merely applying established machine
learning methods to data sets of cyber entities.
Cyber-security involves machine learning challenges
that require elegant methodological and theoretical
handling. We believe that such challenges are of inter-
est to people with passion for machine learning, without
necessarily requiring cyber domain expertise or prior
knowledge. The machine learning community is usu-
ally unaware of these challenges.
We are not the first to discuss security and AI chal-
lenges (Stoica et al. 2017) or alert on the lack of data
sets (Kumar, Wicker, and Swann 2017). The novelty
of our work is the presentation of new cyber-security
problems, the machine learning challenges involved in
them and the publication of data sets that enable in-
vestigating them. We hope it will lead to new methods
in both machine learning and cyber-security.
Cyber-Security Problems
Malware Classification And Detection :
Identifying Malicious Programs
Malware is a program or a file that is harmful to a
computer system. As part of the arms race, the at-
tacker tries to avoid detection. Some evasion techniques
are polymorphism, impersonation, compression and ob-
fuscation (You and Yim 2010). For example, in mal-
ware coloring the attacker slightly change the malware,
leading to polymorphism (many variants). Since many
threat intelligence repositories are based on signatures
of the malware (e.g., SHA1, MD5), a slight modification
enables to a signature-based detection.
Current detection systems use various al-
gorithms: Naive Bayes Classifier(Luo 2016),
SVM (Kuriakose and Vinod 2015), Ran-
dom Forest (Hu and Tan 2017b), DNN
(Xie, Girshick, and Farhadi 2015), CNN
(David and Netanyahu 2015) and LSTM
(Woodbridge et al. 2016; Saxe and Berlin 2017).
Labeling Malware Via Opertor Domain Pivoting
Historically, malware classification was based on signa-
tures and domain experts. However, domain experts
are limited in the number of cases they analyze, and
signatures lead to labeling errors. The large number of
malware and their population rapid growth make the
problem even more severe. For these reasons, we have
constructed a malware data set and grouped malware
contacting the same malicious site.
Let m1,m2 be malware.
Let OperatorDomains(m) be the unique domains
with which the malware communicates.
The specific definition of OperatorDomains(m) is
use case specific and requires domain knowledge. For
example, many malware communicate with benign do-
mains (e.g., google.com) in order to check Internet con-
nectivity. So, communication with Google is not an
indication of the operator or maliciousness. A good
definition of OperatorDomains(m) should focus in ma-
licious (or at least not known benign domains) that are
not communicating with too many files.
If OperatorDomains(m1) ∩
OperatorDomains(m2) 6= ∅, then m1,m2 belong
to the same operator.
Hence, given a data set D of malware and
a OperatorDomains(m) function we label
∀m1,m2 ∈ D, (m1,m2, OperatorDomains(m1) ∩
OperatorDomains(m2) 6= ∅).
In some uses it is more appropriate to work with a
multi-class data set, assigning to each pair an indica-
tion of the class the pair belongs to (e.g., the mutual
domain).
Thanks to that, we have a large number of labels,
agnostic to the content, that can be used to build and
evaluate content-based malware classification models.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that a domain-
based grouping data set is suggested and provided.
Host Similarity : Identifying Malicious
Sources
The same malicious operator will tend to use hosts with
the same services on them, since they are used for the
same need. Having a similarity function among hosts
in the Internet, it will enable us to deduce on one host
using similar hosts. Assume that we see two hosts that
use the same exact version of MySQL, PHP and many
other products. It is unlikely to be coincidence and if
there is threat intelligence on malicious activity of one
host, then it is likely the other host belongs to the same
operator and is used for malicious activity too. Like in
the malware analysis, we can use malware in order to la-
bel related hosts. If a malware communicates with two
malicious domains, the malware are likely to belong to
the same operator and so are the domains. Given the
services profile of the hosts, we can learn the similarity
function and use it to identify new domains for which
we didn’t see malware communication. Attributing dif-
ferent domains to the same operator was done before
(Starov et al. 2018) but as far as we know we are the
first to present host similarity problem based on agnos-
tic label, and provide a data set for it.
Labeling Hosts Via Operator Domain Pivot-
ing The labeling method for hosts is based on
the malware domain labeling. For each domain
d, one can resolve the ip address on which it is
being hosted (e.g., via nslookup). We will mark
the resolving function as resolve(ip). Shodan pro-
vide scans of hosts in the Internet, giving the
signature(ip) of services available on the host. Hence,
given a data set D of malware , and the func-
tions OperatorDomains(m), resolve(ip), signature(ip)
function we label
∀m1,m2 ∈ D, ∀d ∈ OperatorDomains(m1) ∩
OperatorDomains(m2),
∀ip1, ip2 ∈ resolve(d)
(signature(ip1), signature(ip2), T rue).
The negative samples are due to a Cartesian product
of signatures of ip address that don’t obey the positive
samples rule.
Lateral Movement : The Attacker Moves
to its Target
An attacker usually starts an attack in a point in the
network that is far from the final destination. There-
fore, the attacker should learn the network and travel
to the destination, a phase called lateral movement
(Johnson and Hogan 2013). This path might be long
and use edges that on their own might be reasonable
but as a part of a path they might be very suspicious.
The goal of the defender is to learn the access pattern
graphs (which might differ by usage) and use it in order
to assign probabilities to paths.
Stealth Port Scan : The Attacker Explores
its Target
An attacker that has a hold on one host (computer)
in a network is likely to want to gain a hold on other
hosts too. Knowing which services are deployed on
a host might help the attacker to use an exploit for
one of them. Accessing common ports related to
these services can help with mapping the available
services. A port scan (Gadge and Patil 2008) is ac-
cess to a sequence of ports in order to map them.
This technique is problematic from the point of view
of the attacker since a scan of many ports is very
noisy and the attacker might be detected. More
sophisticated attackers, called Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT) (Virvilis and Gritzalis 2013), use stealth
port scans (Staniford, Hoagland, and McAlerney 2002;
?; ?). They select very few informative ports in order
to profile the target host. A possible method to identify
a stealth port based on the low probability of access to
a given combination of ports.
Bind and Reverse Shell : The Attacker
Gets a Hold on its Target
As part of a manually operated targeted attack process,
the attacker may be advancing from host A to host B,
ultimately gaining a remote interactive command shell
on host B. Two very common approaches to achieve a
remote shell are reverse shell and bind shell, and they
can be used interchangeably, commonly depending on
the attacked network structure and firewall configura-
tions. Both methods require two consecutive connec-
tions between the source and the destination and are
available in common penetration tools such as Metas-
ploit (https://www.metasploit.com/). In the bind
shell scenario, an initial connection from A to B is used
to exploit the vulnerability on a specific port (compro-
mised service) and a follow-up connection from A to B
is used as an interactive shell on a different (and com-
monly unused by other services) port. In the reverse
shell scenario, the follow-up connection is from B to A
and not from A to B. To our knowledge, this is the
first time that a labelled data set is provided for this
problem.
Machine Learning Challenges in
Cyber-Security
We detail the below machine learning challenges in
cyber-security. These challenges were chosen since they
are common in cyber-security problems and that coping
with them is essential for solution. For example, imbal-
anced data sets appear whether one tries to do malware
detection, domain reputation or identify network intru-
sion. If one fails to identify an imbalanced data set, one
might end up with a model claiming: ”Everything is be-
nign”. While the model will have astonishing accuracy,
it will provide no value. Off course, the imbalanced
challenge is not unique to the cyber security domain,
yet it is an essential challenge in many cyber security
problems.
Attacker-Defender Game
Cyber-security contexts may have different, purposeful
adversaries with different aims, techniques of attack,
and capabilities, the latter including the knowledge of
their adversary (the defender). Advancement of one
of the sides will not end the game but will lead to a
new round with different settings. Citing Slick Willie
Sutton: ”I rob banks because thats where the money
is”; We know that this game will be played for long
time.
Game theory has been applied to cyber-security
(Manshaei et al. 2013), (Roy et al. 2010). What makes
the game more interesting is the asymmetries in it. The
defense systems are usually deployed before the attack
and the attacker can treat them as given. We can as-
sume that the attacker knows which defense system
they should cope with. The attacker might even have
access to the defense system and know its logic.
There are also asymmetries in the knowledge. The
attacker knows the goals of the attack, the timing and
the attack steps. The defender is familiar with the pro-
tected assets and the attacked network. A typical ex-
ample of the use of such asymmetry in the knowledge
is the use of honeypots (Spitzner 2003). Honeypots are
traps, hosts that no benign user should access. The
attacker, not knowing that, might access the honeypot
and found by the defender.
The defender can win not only by preventing an at-
tack, but also by making it infeasible. Cyber-espionage
is less attractive if the secrets will be found out years
after they were used. Cyber-crime economics will make
long attack not profitable in most cases.
The last interesting point is considering not a single
attack as a game but the entire cyber-security arena
as a game. A malware caught in one network might
be uploaded to common threat intelligence repositories
(e.g. https://www.virustotal.com/) and be identi-
fied in other locations. The defending side can proac-
tively hunt resources and tools used by attackers (e.g.,
malicious domains, files signatures), making the com-
promising of future attacks easier. Coping with the
host similarity problem is an important step in this di-
rection.
Lack of Labeled Samples and Certainty in
Ground Truth
Most cyber-security tasks are essentially supervised
learning tasks. Given an entity or activity, we should
decide whether it is malicious or benign. Unfortunately,
many times we lack the labels which are required for su-
pervised learning.
Manual labeling is limited in scope and subjective.
Therefore, most labels are coming from heuristics.
Other than having errors, one might end up trying to
model the heuristics he started with.
Using the community knowledge is a common ap-
proach. When the entity to classify is universal (ap-
pearing also outside the examined case, like a malware
or a malicious domain but not network activity), one
can use external black lists and white lists for labels.
This method may introduce a domain adaption prob-
lem , since the lists are not coming from the same source
as the entities to classify. Off course, such lists might
be of low quality.
Consensus agreement, using the verdict of many
vendors as the concept, is another common solution.
Other than the potential intellectual property prob-
lems, there are algorithmic problems with this ap-
proach. The consensus doesn’t necessarily agree with
the ground truth. Important demonstration of this
problem is with Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)
(Virvilis and Gritzalis 2013). Attacks of APTs are usu-
ally sophisticated and targeted. An APT will tend to
use its malware on a single target and therefore its mal-
ware won’t have threat intelligence recognizing it and
so the malware will evade detection. Using consensus
agreement as the concept is like asking your model not
to detect APTs.
Algorithmic solutions might in-
volve the use of unsupervised learning
(Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009) meth-
ods and specifically anomaly detection
(Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar 2009). While
anomaly detection is popular in many domains, it
is usually not used in cyber-security due to inherent
difficulties (Sommer and Paxson 2010), that we see as
machine learning challenges. These solutions may be
problematic since some domains, like networks, have a
plethora of benign anomalies. A sophisticated attacker
is likely to be aware of the defender and try to make
sure that its actions do not look anomalous. In this
scenario we might end up with plenty of anomalies,
none of which is related to the attacker.
Some promising research directions are active
learning (Settles 2010) and semi-supervised learning
(Zhu 2006). Active learning can help in identifying the
most informative entities to label, and help in building a
small labeled data set. One should note that some of the
labeling is subjective and in many cases it is not possible
to label with high certainty. This leads us to learning
in the presence of labeling errors (Kearns and Li 1993),
(Kearns 1998). Given a small labeled data set, one can
apply semi supervised learning and by doing so be able
to predict as in supervised learning.
Imbalanced Data Sets
We consider a data set to be imbalanced when the ra-
tios between the majority set and the minority sets are
large (Chawla and Japkowicz 2004). While that in the
machine learning community a ratio of 1 to 10 is consid-
ered imbalanced, malicious training examples in cyber-
security data sets may be extremely rare, and imbalance
ratios of 1 to 10,000 are common.
When the ratio between the sets is large but there are
enough samples in each set, we use the term relative im-
balance. In the more severe case in which there are not
enough samples in the minority set, this is absolute im-
balance. This is a common situation in cyber-security.
The Tragedy of Metrics
As we said, in the typical cyber-security use case we
have only a handful positive labeled samples and we
usually don’t know how many other samples in our data
set are actually positive.
This leads to a tragedy that goes much further than
algorithmic considerations. Since we don’t know what
the actual positives are, we usually cannot know the
positive rates. This in turn means that we cannot esti-
mate our recall. Note that the cost of a false positive
is a waste of some hours, loss of confidence in the sys-
tem and in the long term the loss of a customer by the
vendor. On the other hand, the cost of false negative
might be millions of times more expensive. The in-
ability of estimating recall leads customers and vendors
into improving the precision. Since it is easy to trade
off recall for precision by requiring higher confidence,
we might expose the protected assets to more risk by
racing to reduce false alarms.
A common method to handle this scenario is to use a
cost matrix and assign a higher cost to false negatives.
This method is not directly applicable here since we are
not aware of our false negatives.
Achieving high lift is usually passed unnoticed. If the
positive ratio is 1 to 10,000 and our classifiers precision
is 10% than our precision lift is 1,000. However, the
user of the system observes a single success in 10 alerts,
which is not observed as good performance.
The common assumption of Independent Identical
Distribution doesn’t hold in cyber-security. For ex-
ample, malware coloring leads to many polymorphic
variations of the same malware. These instances are
very dependent, making the usual statistical guarantees
misleading. Even without deliberate attempts the as-
sumption might be violated. Hosts in the same network
segment (e.g., DMZ) are related. Being able to iden-
tify hardware of the same vendor will probably won’t
generalize well to other vendors. There is a need for
mathematical methods to cope with these scenarios.
Domain Adaptation
Domain adaptation is a scenario in which the test dis-
tribution on which a model is evaluated is different from
the train distribution that was used to build the model
(III 2009). The cyber world looks different in each of
its areas. Threats, entities and networking behavior
are different among parties acting in various scales, do-
mains, cultures and geo-locations. A basic challenge
therefore is adapting an effective defense from one do-
main to another.
Concept Drift
A security expert copes successfully with the challenges
listed above and deploys high performing system to pro-
duction environment. In a short time, the system suf-
fers a severe degradation in performance. The model
did not change. It is the world that changed. Cyber-
security is a rapidly evolving field. Models and insights
are likely to become obsolete quickly. Volumes change
due to technological advancement, new protocols and
domains appear and malicious activity also has trends
and fashions. The change in the source of analyzed
entity due to a change in time is called concept drift
(Gu, Tan, and He 2013). To avoid continually starting
from scratch, ways to track concept drift and extreme
changes in the domain need to be developed.
Data Sets
We think that the use of machine learning in cyber-
security should change. We also think that the cyber
community should help the machine learning commu-
nity to become more involved in this field.
One of the key obstacles to investigating
cyber-security problems is the lack of appro-
priate data sets. There are many important
cyber-security data sets like Microsoft’s malware
data set (Ronen et al. 2018), Los Alamos’s traf-
fic data set (Turcotte, Kent, and Hash 2017) and
EndGame’s Ember malware properties data set
(Anderson and Roth 2018). However, we feel that
there are no suitable data sets that will enable aca-
demic researchers to cope with the problems and
challenges we listed.
In general, companies do not tend to share their data,
and cyber-security data is even more sensitive than
usual. However, by using anonymization, a bit older
data, and removing sensitive information, one can ad-
dress most concerns. Once this is done, the data con-
tributing company will be able to enjoy from the com-
bined work of a world of experts working on cyber prob-
lems.
The following data sets were contributed by Palo Alto
Networks and Shodan (for academic use only). We do
hope that these data sets will boost the research of
machine learning in cyber-security. We also hope that
other organizations will follow and publish more data
sets and the research will be further boosted.
Access to Data Sets
We would like to provide researchers access to the data
sets for academic use. In order to gain access to the data
sets please contact data-sets@paloaltonetworks.com
with ”Access to data request” in the title.
Malware Polymorphism
We relate a malware to the domains it contacted. The
data set is made of a sample of malware identified by
Palo Alto Networks in a given period. For each malware
we provide identifiers and the domains accessed by the
file. One can find malware variants by creating pairs
of files communicating with the same domains. Exam-
ples of pairs that are not variants can be generated by
matching files communicating with no common domain.
Note that one can generate O(n2) negative pairs and it
is up to the researcher to choose the threshold that fits
best its needs.
The malware data set construction demonstrates
away to cope with the lack of labeled samples. The
labels are imbalanced. The variety of malware lead to
domain adaptation. We would like to provide in the
future data collected on later periods, and present con-
cept drift.
Malware data set
• SHA256 The signature of the file given the SHA-256
hash function.
• md5 The signature of the file given the MD5 hash
function.
• ssdeep The signature of the file given the SSDEEP
fuzzy hash function
• size File size
Communication data set
• SHA256 The signature of the file given the SHA-256
hash function.
• domain The name of the domain with which the mal-
ware communicated. A malware that communicated
with few domains will have a record per domain.
• IP The IP address to which the domain was resolved.
Host Similarity
The host similarity data set is based on the malware
polymorphism data set. We consider two hosts (repre-
sented as IP addresses) as similar if the same malware
communicated with both.
The host similarity data set construction demon-
strates a way to cope with the lack of labeled samples.
The labels are imbalanced. The variety of host lead to
domain adaptation. We would like to provide in the
future data collected on later periods, and present con-
cept drift.
Shodan (https://www.shodan.io/) contributed the
host services signature: The list of services opened on
the host and the profile of each service. For example,
see https://www.shodan.io/host/180.183.160.140.
Given the pairs of related and unrelated host, generated
by malware polymorphism, one can learn a similarity
function in the services space. This similarity function
enables identifying hosts similar to a host in question.
Given that the similar hosts are malicious, it is likely
that the considered host belongs to the same operator
and is also malicious.
The communication data set from the malware poly-
morphism section is applicable here too.
For each IP address, we provide the the scan result
in a JSON format. For details about the format, see
Shodan https://www.shodan.io/).
Ngrams Data Set
The data set is a derived from a series of benign and
malicious files, with identifying names (SHA256s) re-
moved, gathered over a period of about a month in
2017. For each file, we capture a histogram of 4-grams
of the byte code. For example, the string 01234 would
produce the 4-grams 0123 and 1234. Note that you can
derive approximate (exact except for the end of file) 1,
2, and 3 grams from this data. We also have labels and
family tags. The labels are benign, malicious, question-
able. The tags describe families of malware, not every
sample has a family tag, some have more than one. The
median number of 4grams per file is 105,888.
The variety of malware lead to domain adaptation.
We would like to provide in the future data collected
on later periods, and present concept drift.
There are two pieces of data:
1. A mapping of files indices to ngrams where each line
is a tab separated list:
• File Index
• Ngram 1 : Ngram 1 Count
• Ngram 2 : Ngram 2 Count
• etc.
2. A mapping of files to labels where each line is a tab
separated list:
• File Index
• Verdict (0=benign, 1=malware, 2=greyware)
• Family Label 1
• Family Label 2
• etc.
Android Malware Family Data Set
The data set is a derived from a series of mixed Android
APK files, with identifying names (SHA256s) removed,
gathered over a period of about a month in 2017. For
each file, we provide an XML report of metadata gener-
ated during the static and dynamic analysis (generated
by WildF ireATM . For example, the certificate that
used to sign the Android APK file; the domains that
being contacted after the APK file got installed; the
API call sequences after installation. We also have la-
bels and family tags. The labels are benign, malicious,
greyware. The family tags describe family names of
malware. One malware may have multiple family tags.
The labels in this data set are imbalanced. The va-
riety of malware lead to domain adaptation. We would
like to provide in the future data collected on later pe-
riods, and present concept drift.
There are two pieces of data:
1. A mapping of files to labels and tags:
• File Index
• static report : a JSON object
• dynamic report : a JSON object
• file info : a JSON object
2. A mapping of files to labels where each line is a tab
separated list:
• File Index
• Verdict (0=benign, 1=malware, 2=greyware)
• Family Label 1
• Family Label 2
• etc.
Bind Shell Data Set
The bind shell data set was collected from some net-
works over a period of 4 months. It consists of a set of
consecutive connection pairs, that were created by pair-
ing connections from source to destination that follow
the following rules:
The data set presents the challenge of lack of labels
and is also highly imbalanced.
1. Both connections are observed within a specific short
time frame.
2. The destination port of the first connection is differ-
ent from the second connection.
3. The connection pairs make good candidates for actual
bind shell attack, based on a noise filtering algorithm
applied at collection time.
The aggregative features mentioned below that re-
late to counts of hosts and ports are calculated on the
connection pairs from the entire network without noise
filtering over a given time period.
Each connection pair has the following features:
• index , Index of the sample
• label , Is forward shell, 1 for true, 0 for false, -1 for
missing
• source host id , Index of the source
• is new , True if the source and destination hosts were
not seen on the network for a period of time prior to
the creation of the connection pair
• s phase1 initiators hosts , Amount of Destinations
accessed from this source using the same phase 1 port
• s phase2 initiators hosts , Amount of destinations ac-
cessed from this source using the same phase 2 port
• s phase1 initiators ports , Amount of distinct
phase 2 ports accessed from this source to all des-
tinations using the same phase 1 ports
• s phase2 initiators ports , Amount of distinct
phase 1 ports accessed from this source to all des-
tinations using the same phase 2 port
• s port count , Popularity of this phase 1 and phase 2
ports couple across the network
• s src port phase1 , Port used in the first session
• s src port phase2 , Port used in the second session
• s pair phase1 cnt , Amount of distinct phase 1 ports
between this source and destination
• s pair phase2 cnt , Amount of distinct phase 2 ports
between this source and destination
• s start time phase1 , Start time of the first session
• s start time phase2 , Start time of the second session
• s duration phase1 , Duration of the first session
• s duration phase2 , Duration of the second session
• s dst port phase1 , Destination port of the first ses-
sion
• s dst port phase2 , Destination port of the second
session
• s volume phase1 , Volume (source to destination) of
the first session
• s volume phase2 , Volume of the second session
• s rvolume phase1 , Returning volume (destination to
source) of the first session
• s rvolume phase2 , Returning volume (destination to
source) of the second session
• s path phase1 , Protocol used in the first session
• s path phase2 , Protocol used in the second session
• s spfss unique srcs , Amount of distinct sources cre-
ating connections to the candidate’s destination with
the same phase 1 and phase 2 ports
• s arb host count , Amount of sources that accessed
this destination with the same phase 1 port and fol-
lowed up with another connection (i.e. a phase 2 ses-
sion was detected)
• s arb port count , Amount of distinct phase 2 ports
accessed after accessing this destination and phase 1
port
Network Traffic Data Set
The network traffic data set is a collection of network
sessions. The sessions are aggregated in 10 minutes
buckets. Hence, if A communicated with B twice in
that bucket there will be a single traffic record with
cnt=2.
The data set lacks labels and even the concepts of
stealth port scan and lateral movement are a bit vague
(e.g., How long should be a path of hosts in order to
be considered as lateral movement). The data sets
were collected from different sites, presenting domain
adaptation challenge. Data set from different periods
present concept drift.
The columns are the following:
• min start time Time of the session, data set begin-
ning is set to Alan Turings birthday, June 23th, 1912
, and relative time is given.
• src index Source IP representation. IP addresses are
collected in this in the index in the data set (in order
to keep privacy).
• dst index Destination IP representation. IP ad-
dresses are collected in this in the index in the data
set (in order to keep privacy).
• src port Source port
• dst port Destination port
• tvolume Volume of traffic from source to destination
• rtvolume Volume of traffic from destination to source
• pkt Number of packets from source to destination
• rpkt Number of packets destination to source
• cnt Number of sessions
• failed num number of failed sessions
• path Protocol used for communication
This data set can be used for the cyber problems of
stealth port scan and lateral movement.
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